International Competition, Growth and Optimal R&D Subsidies by Giammario Impullitti
International Competition, Growth, and Optimal R&D
Subsidies∗
Giammario Impullitti†
First draft: June 2005; this draft: February 2006
Abstract
In this paper I examine the eﬀects of international technological competition on inno-
vation, growth, and optimal R&D subsidies. I focus on a particular dimension of com-
petition: the share of industries where domestic and foreign research ﬁrms compete for
innovation. In a version of the fully-endogenous quality-ladder growth model I show
that the eﬀect of competition on innovation and growth depends on the speciﬁcation of
the research technology. Secondly, I ﬁnd that increases in foreign competition trigger a
business-stealing eﬀect that reduces income and welfare and, regardless of the innovation
eﬀect, raises the optimal domestic R&D subsidy. Intuitively, the higher the threat of
international competition the more instrumental innovation subsidies will be in helping
domestic incumbent ﬁrms to retain their shares of the global market. Thirdly, I perform
a quantitative exercise: I ﬁrst build an empirical index of international technological com-
petition and ﬁnd that in the OECD countries the share of competitive sectors increased
from 35 percent in 1973 to 70 percent in 1989. Then, I use this evidence to evaluate the
optimality of the U.S. R&D subsidy response to observed competition in that period. I
ﬁnd a welfare loss of the observed policy, relative to the optimal, ranging between 0.2 and
0.5 percentage points of quality-adjusted per-capita consumption. Finally, I extend the
model to account for strategic policy complementarities and show that the positive eﬀect
of competition on the optimal subsidy is robust to this set up. In addition, I ﬁnd that
competition increases the beneﬁts from R&D policy cooperation.
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11 Introduction
Whether foreign competition has a positive or a negative eﬀe c to nn a t i o n a lw e l f a r ea n do nt h e
long run rate of growth is an old question in economics. Schumpeter (1942), while speculating
on the modus operandi of competition, points out that innovation rather than price is the main
instrument of competition. In Schumpeter’s view, higher competition does not mean a higher
elasticity of demand for goods but a larger number of innovators working to appropriate each
others rents. The entry of innovative ﬁrms, domestic and foreign, would stimulates innovation,
long-run output growth and increase national welfare.1 More recently, the strategic trade
policy literature emphasized another eﬀect of foreign competition that, though strictly related
to the Schumpeterian innovation eﬀect, aﬀects national welfare negatively. The entry of foreign
innovators increases the threat of business-stealing, which shifts proﬁt rents from domestic to
foreign ﬁrms, thus reducing domestic income and welfare.
Hence, in debating the implications of foreign competition, economists have mainly focused
on two major forces: the innovation eﬀect and the business-stealing eﬀect. The relative strength
of these two counteracting eﬀects has also been at the root of recent policy debates on the impact
of international competition. The “competitiveness debate” of the early 1990s was triggered by
the reaction to the Clinton administration’s target of regaining global technological leadership
by means of strategic trade and industrial policies. The arguments of the opponents to strategic
policies relied mainly on eﬃciency improvements brought by trade, and the arguments of the
strategists were based on the business-stealing eﬀect produced by foreign competition (see, for
example, Krugman, 1994, and, 1996, and Tyson, 1992).
At the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, the heads of member states promised to
make the E.U. "the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world"
by 2010. This ambitious political project of pushing Europe towards a global technological
supremacy, also known as the Lisbon Agenda, has fueled new debates among economists, policy
makers and in the business community. The key issue here is to identify the role for strategic
innovation policy in a increasingly competitive global economy (see, Sapir 2003 and Kok 2004).
Although the new trade theory and the endogenous growth literature provide many funda-
1In Schumpeter’s own words: “[...] in capitalistic reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not
that type of competition [price competition] that counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization [...] -competition which commands a decisive
cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the proﬁts and the outputs of the existing
ﬁrms but at their foundations and their very lives". [Schumpeter (1941) p.84-86].
2mental tools to study these problems, little attention has been dedicated to a speciﬁca n a l y s i s
of the welfare eﬀects of international competition in growing economies. Moreover, the explo-
ration of the optimal policy implications of competition has been particularly neglected. In this
paper I investigate the eﬀects of changes in the scale of international technological competition
on innovation, national welfare and R&D subsidies. I set up a fully-endogenous Schumpeterian
growth model (Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998, Howitt, 1999, Young, 1998), with two coun-
tries showing the same population, preferences and technology, but with diﬀerent innovation
s u b s i d i e sa n di n n o v a t i v es e to fs e c t o r s .Is u p p o s et h a tf o r e i g nR & Dﬁrms invest in innovation
and challenge home ﬁrms, only in a subset of industries, while home ﬁrms remain unchallenged
leaders in the remaining sectors. Therefore, there are some sectors where ﬁrms from both
countries compete to discover the next best-quality good and appropriate monopoly rents. The
measure of this set of industries, where research from both countries overlaps, will be my index
of international competition. I study the eﬀects on domestic welfare, on the rate of innovation,
and on the optimal R&D subsidy, of an increase in the set of competing sectors.
Ib e g i nw i t has i m p l i ﬁed economy showing constant returns to scale to R&D and no policy
asymmetry between countries, and ﬁnd that competition has no innovation eﬀects, and has a
business-stealing eﬀect that reduces domestic income and welfare. I then introduce country
and sector-speciﬁc decreasing returns to scale (DRS) to R&D and ﬁnd that there is a positive
innovation eﬀect of competition whose strength is positively related to the concavity of the R&D
technology. It follows that the welfare eﬀect of competition is ambiguous and depends on the
relative power of the business-stealing and innovation eﬀects. The speciﬁcation of parameters
is key in determining the ﬁnal result, especially the one that pins down the returns to R&D.2
The driving mechanism behind the two counteracting eﬀects of competition are the follow-
ing. On the one hand, the entry of foreign R&D workers in some sectors implies that, with a
probability proportional to their research eﬀort, monopolistic rents will shift from domestic to
foreign ﬁrms. The shift of global market leadership in some sectors in favor of foreign ﬁrms will
reduce aggregate domestic proﬁts, income and national welfare. On the other hand, country-
speciﬁc DRS to R&D implies higher productivity of research in competitive sectors. It follows
2The introduction of DRS to R&D makes the model analytically intractable. Thus, as it is often the case with
endogenous growth models with asymmetric countries, I use numerical simulations to study the implications of
my framework. Since the two countries have the same technologies, same preferences, and same populations my
set up can be interpreted as a standard North-North trade model with endogenous technology. The countries’
asymmetries are limited to the diﬀerent national distribution of research accross sectors, and to country-speciﬁc
R&D subsidies.
3that increases in competition make the research activity more eﬃcient, so raising aggregate
innovation, growth, and, via quality improvements, national welfare.
Once I have explored the pure eﬀects of competition on welfare I introduce strategic inno-
vation policy by letting the domestic government choose the welfare maximizing levels of R&D
subsidies in response to to changes in foreign competition - the foreign government is again
assumed to be inactive. The result is that the optimal domestic subsidy is increasing in foreign
competition for a wide range of parameters - even in those cases when competition is welfare
improving. As foreign researchers enter the market, the threat of business-stealing raises along
with the role R&D subsidies as an international rent-protecting device. In a more competitive
economy government subsidies improve the ability of domestic ﬁrms to retain their shares of
the global market.
I apply this result in evaluating the optimality of the U.S. policy response to the increase
in international competition in the 1970s and 1980s. There is a substantial body of empirical
evidence suggesting that in this period the U.S. experience increasing challenges to its techno-
logical leadership from abroad, mainly from Japan and European economies recovering from
World War II. For instance, we observe a radical erosion of U.S. leadership in high-tech sectors:
between 1980 and 1991 the global market share of the United States in the high-tech markets
declined by 16 percent, while Japan’s share increased by about 30 percent. Japan’s share of
high-tech export doubled from about 7 percent in 1970-73 to about 16 percent in 1988-89,
while the U.S. share declined from 30 percent to about 21 percent. The loss of U.S. leader-
ship was concentrated in four major high-tech sectors: electronics, aircraft and parts, scientiﬁc
instruments, and medical equipment.3
Using OECD ANBERD data on R&D investment by industry I build an index of interna-
tional R&D rivalry that matches my deﬁnition of technological competition and ﬁnd that the
U.S. unchallenged supremacy in research spending declined in the 1970s and 1980s. Speciﬁcally,
I use R&D investment data at the two and three-digit industry level for manufacturing sectors,
and consider a sector competitive if the U.S. share of global investment is below 50 percent.
I found that the share of competitive sectors raises from 35 percent in 1973 to 70 in 1989.
The result does not change very much when choosing a diﬀerent threshold, weighting sectors
with their value added, or focusing only on high-tech sectors. Furthermore, I also build a more
3See NSF (1998), appendix table 6-5., Guerrieri Milana (1991), and Tyson (1992)
4standard indicator of R&D concentration, the Herﬁndahl index, and obtain similar qualitative
trends.
A second piece of evidence that I take into account is that the erosion of the US leadership,
especially in high-tech sectors, led policy makers to introduce new policy tools to deal with
competitiveness threats (see Mowery, 1998, Ham and Mowery, 1997, and Cozzi and Impullitti,
2004). The scope of the new set of policies was to facilitate ﬁrms’ access to public technology,
to improve intellectual property rights and, more in general, to reduce the private cost of
innovation. In this paper I propose a ﬁrst attempt at evaluating the optimality of the U.S.
policy response to increasing international competition in the 1970’s and 1980s. I focus on
one of the new policy tools introduced during this period: the R&D subsidy implicit in the
Research and Experimentation (R&E) Tax Credit initiated in 1981. The quantitative exercise
consists in computing the welfare loss of the observed U.S. policy response, with respect to
the optimal policy, to changes in my indicator of international R&D competition in the period
1973-89. The results show a welfare loss of the order of 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points of the
quality-adjusted per-capita consumption, and show that the loss is increasing in competition.
The ﬁnal part of the paper contains an extension of the basic framework: I remove the
assumption that only the domestic economy has an active innovation policy that responds to
competition, so allowing the model to analyze the eﬀects of strategic policy complementarities.
First, I ﬁnd that countries’ best response functions are increasing in the space of R&D subsidies.
This suggests the existence of strategic policy complementarities related to the business-stealing
eﬀect of subsidies. Second, I study the eﬀects of changes in competition on the Nash subsidy: I
show that the result that increases in competition raise the optimal domestic subsidy is robust
to an environment with strategic policy complementarities. Moreover, I compute the gains
from international cooperation in R&D policy relative to the non-cooperative solution, and
show that the leader, the domestic country, loses from cooperation at low levels of competition,
while gains became increasingly positive at high levels.
This paper is related to several branches of literature. In the ﬁrst place, the paper relates
directly to the endogenous growth literature and, more precisely, to the neo-Schumpeterian
strand. Several papers in this literature have studied the impact of international trade and
international competition on growth and, to a lesser extent on national welfare (e.g. Grossman
and Helpman 1991 and Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Aghion and Griﬃth 2005, Klundert and
5Smulders 1997, Peretto 1999). These works have focused primarily on the innovation and
growth eﬀects, and changes in international competition have been mainly modeled as changes
in the size of the market or in the degree of product market competition. Furthermore, little
attention has been dedicated to the welfare eﬀects of international competition and to its R&D
policy implications. One exception is Tang and Waelde (2001) that have investigated the welfare
eﬀects of product market competition and discussed its implications for trade policy.
My paper contributes to this this literature for the following reasons: ﬁrst I adopt a pure
Schumpeterian view of competition in that it is not determined by the market structure but
by the number of sectors where diﬀerent countries compete for innovation. Second, I study
the welfare eﬀects of competition and I also explicitly explore its implications for optimal
research subsidies. Third, I focus only on R&D subsidies, and I do not consider any policies
or barriers that restrict trade. In a world where other types of trade and industrial policies
are now more and more regulated internationally, R&D policies still remain in the domain of
national policy makers. Thus, in studing the welfare and optimal policy eﬀects of international
competition it seems important to focus on policy tools that can be implemented autonomously
by governments of diﬀent countries.
The idea of emphasizing the business-stealing eﬀect of international competition has its
origins in the strategic trade and industrial policy literature. In a pioneering contribution,
Brander and Spencer (1983) showed that, when two countries compete in a R&D race for the
world industrial leadership, it will be optimal for governments to subsidize R&D. At the root of
this result there is the idea that the monopoly power that characterizes many traded goods (par-
ticularly high-tech goods) provides incentives for governments’ intervention: capturing larger
market shares of the production of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms increases national income and
welfare.4 Most of the contributions in the strategic trade literature limit the analysis to uni-
lateral policies and to export to a third market. These assumptions are restrictive in that they
allow neither to study strategic policy complementarities and nor to account for the eﬀect of
R&D subsidies on consumers’ surplus (innovation-eﬀect). Recently, Haaland and Kind (2004)
and (2005) have overcome these limits by allowing all countries to be active in innovation policy
and removing the simplifying assumption that all output is exported to a third market.
Overall this literature is conﬁned to static partial equilibruim models where the dynamic
4For a survey see Brander (1995).
6eﬀects of innovation are not taken into account. I introduce a strategic industrial policy game
into an endogenous growth model and account for both the innovation eﬀect and the business-
stealing eﬀect of research subsidies. Moreover, I study the interaction between international
technological competition, strategic policy complementarities, and the gains from R&D policy
coordination.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. In section
3 I study the pure eﬀect of competition on innovation, growth and welfare, in the absence
of policy. In section 4 I introduce innovation policy and study the eﬀects of competition on
optimal R&D subsidies in a set up where only the domestic government is active. Section 5
presents an application of my results: I compute the welfare loss associated with the U.S. R&D
subsidy response to the observed increase in competition, relative to the optimal subsidy, in
the period 1973-89. In section 6 I extend the model to account for the presence of strategic
policy complementarities, check the robustness of my ﬁndings in this broader set up and, ﬁnally,
evaluate the beneﬁts from R&D policy cooperation. Section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 Households
Consider a two-country economy in which population, preferences, technologies, and institu-
tions are identical in both countries. Households have identical intertemporally additively
separable preferences with unit elasticity over an inﬁnite set of consumption goods indexed by
ω ∈ [0,1]. Each household is endowed with a unit of labor time whose supply generates no
disutility. Dropping country indexes for notational simplicity, households choose their optimal










































7where N0 is the initial population and n i si t sc o n s t a n tg r o w t hr a t e ,ρ is the common rate of
time preference - with ρ>n-a n dr(t) is the market interest rate on a risk-free bond available
in both countries. q(j,ω,t) is the per-member ﬂow of good ω, of quality j ∈ {0,1,2,...},
purchased by a household at time t ≥ 0 -ω is deﬁned on the product line [0,1]. p(j,ω,t) is
the price of good ω of quality j at time t, c(t) is nominal expenditure, and W(0) and Z(0)
are human and non-human wealth levels. A new vintage of a good ω yields a quality equal
to λ times the quality of the previous vintage, with λ>1.D i ﬀerent versions of the same
good ω are regarded by consumers as perfect substitutes after adjusting for their quality ratios,
and jmax(ω,t) denotes the maximum quality in which the good ω is available at time t.A si s
common in quality ladders models I will assume price competition at all dates, which implies
that in equilibrium only the top quality product is produced and consumed in positive amounts.
T is a per-capita lump-sum tax.
The instantaneous utility function has unitary elasticity of substitution between every pair
of product lines. Thus, households maximize static utility by spreading their expenditures
evenly across the product line and by purchasing in each line only the product with the lowest
price per unit of quality, that is the product of quality j = jmax(ω,t). Hence, the household’s




for j = j
max(ω,t) and is zero otherwise (2)
The presence of a lump sum tax does not change the standard solution of the intertemporal




= r(t) − ρ (3)
2.2 Product market
In each country, ﬁrms can hire workers to produce any consumption good ω ∈ [0,1] of the
second best quality under a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology described by the simple
unit cost function wK,w h e r eK = D,F is the country indicator, domestic (D)a n df o r e i g n
(F) .H o w e v e ri ne a c hi n d u s t r yt h et o pq u a l i t yp r o d u c tc a nb em a n u f a c t u r e do n l yb yt h eﬁrm
that has discovered it, whose rights are protected by a perfectly enforceable world-wide patent
law. Therefore, multinational companies are free to establish subsidiaries in low wage countries
8to carry out the manufacturing of their products; in equilibrium, labor prices will equalize. I
c h o o s et h ew a g ea st h en u m e r a i r e ,t h a ti s :wD = wF =1 .
As usual in Schumpeterian models with vertical innovation (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman,
1991 and Aghion and Howitt, 1998) the next best vintage of a good is invented by means of the
R&D performed by challenger ﬁrms in order to earn monopoly proﬁts that will be destroyed by
the next innovator. During each temporary monopoly, the patent holder can sell the product at
prices higher than the unit cost. I assume, as standard in the literature, that the patent expires
when further innovation occurs in the industry. Hence the monopolist rents are destroyed not
only by obsolescence but also because a competitive fringe can copy the product using the same
CRS technology.
The unit elastic demand structure encourages the monopolist to set the highest possible
price to maximize proﬁts, but the existence of a competitive fringe sets a ceiling to it equal to
the world’s lowest unit cost of the previous quality product.5 This allows us to conclude that
the price p(jmax(ω,t),ω,t) of every top quality good is:
p(j
max(ω,t),ω,t)=λ,f o ra l lω ∈ [0,1] and t ≥ 0.( 4 )
From the static consumer demand (2) we can immediately conclude that the demand for
each product ω is:
(cD(t)+cF(t))N(t)
λ
= q(ω,t),( 5 )
The above equation implies that, in equilibrium, supply and demand of every consumption
good coincides. It follows that the stream of monopoly proﬁts accruing to the monopolist
which produces a state-of-the-art quality product in country k = D,F will be equal to:
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where I(ω,t) denotes the worldwide Poisson arrival rate of an innovation that will destroy the
monopolist’s proﬁts in industry ω. This is an arbitrage condition which states that the expected
rate of return of a stock issued by an R&D ﬁrm is equal to the riskless rate of return r(t).T h i s
follows from the assumption that there are eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets channelling savings into
R&D ﬁrms.
5Any CES utility index with elasticity of substitution not greater than one would imply this result.
92.3 R&D races
In each industry leaders are challenged by the R&D ﬁrms that employ workers and produce
a probability intensity of inventing the next version of their products. The arrival rate of
innovation in industry ω at time t is I(ω,t), and it is the aggregate summation of the Poisson
arrival rate of innovation produced by all R&D ﬁrms targeting product ω.
Every R&D ﬁr mc a np r o d u c eaP o i s s o na r r i v a lr a t eo fi n n o v a t i o ni nt h ep r o d u c tl i n ei t












where X(ω,t) > 0 measures the degree of complexity in the invention of the next qual-
ity product in industry ω, LK(ω,t)=
P
i lK




i (ω,t) is the total investment in R&D (total arrival rate) in country K.T h i s
technology implies that each ﬁrm’s instantaneous probability of success is a decreasing function
of the total domestic R&D investment in the industry. A possible interpretation of this prop-
erty is that when ﬁrms do more R&D in a sector, the probability of duplicative research eﬀort
increases, thereby reducing the probability that any single ﬁrm will discover the next vintage
of goods and appropriate the proﬁt rent associated to it. Therefore, the sector-speciﬁcn e g a t i v e
externality in research technology produces decreasing returns to scale (DRS) in R&D at the
industry level.6 Moreover, I assume the negative externality produced by duplicative research
is country-speciﬁc. The country-speciﬁc nature of DRS in R&D could be motivated by the
presence of some ﬁxed costs such as lab equipment.7
The technological complexity index X(ω,t) was introduced into endogenous growth theory
after Jones’ (1995) empirical criticism of R&D based growth models generating scale eﬀects in
the steady state per-capita growth rate. It is standard to assign the index two alternative laws
of motion. I will use the one introduced by Dinopoulos and Thompson [1998], that is
X(ω,t)=2 κN(t), (PEG)
6A similar industry-speciﬁc externality with a similar interpretation can be found in Segerstrom and Lund-
borg (2002).
7A typical microfundation for this is attainable by relating the country-speciﬁc R&D externality to heteroge-
neous ability of workers (Eaton and Kortum 1999). As investment in research increases in a country, workers of
lower ability will be used and R&D productivity will decline. In my model the presence of global labor markets
do not allow for this type of intuition.
10with positive k, thereby formalizing the idea that it is more diﬃcult to introduce a new product
in a more crowded market. The PEG, as well as others that are similar, rules out implausible
“scale eﬀects”. More precisely, this formulation allows for sustained per-capita growth without
population growth and leads to a class of models also know as fully-endogenous growth frame-
works (Aghion and Howitt 2004).8 In the present framework with quality improving consumer
goods, ”growth” is interpreted as the increase over time of the representative consumer utility
level.
Each R&D ﬁrm chooses lK
i in order to maximize its expected discounted proﬁts.9 Free












The usual Arrow or replacement eﬀect [Aghion and Howitt 1992] implies that the monopolist
does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to undertake any R&D at the equilibrium wages. Putting together


















where I have substituted the proﬁt equation (6) into the equation for the value of the ﬁrm.
This condition, together with the Euler equation summarizes the utility maximizing household
choice of consumption and savings, and the proﬁt maximizing choice of manufacturing and
R&D ﬁrms. Introducing the labor market clearing condition allows us to close the model and
look for a general equilibrium solution.
8A c r o n y m“ P E G ”r e f e r st ot h e“ p e r m a n e n te ﬀe c t so ng r o w t h ”o fp o l i c ym e a s u r e ss u c ha sR & Ds u b s i d i e sa n d
tariﬀs: they can alter the steady state pe-rcapita growth rate. A diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the diﬃculty index,
proposed by Segerstrom (1998), is
.
X(ω,s)
X(ω,s) = µI(ω,s), and it formalizes the idea that early discovery ﬁsh out the
easier inventions ﬁrst, leaving the most diﬃcult ones for the future. This speciﬁcation is called (TEG), and it
refers to the fact that it implies only “temporary eﬀects on growth” of policy measures. That is the reason why
models that use this speciﬁcation are also known as semi-endogenous growth models (see also Peretto 1998,
Kortum 1997 amd Jones 1995).









i (1 − sK)
where sk is the R&D subsidy
112.4 Modeling international competition: the overlapping research
support.
Before closing the model I need to introduce our deﬁnition of international competition. I model
competition as the measure of the set of sectors where research from both countries overlaps.
Let ξc be the set of industries where domestic and foreign researchers compete to discover the
next best vintage of goods. I assume that foreign ﬁrms do not compete for innovation in the
subset 1−ξc,w h e r ed o m e s t i cﬁrms do not face any foreign threat to their leadership. I choose
_
ω ∈ (0,1) to be the measure of the subset of industries ξc. Therefore the composition of the












m(t),ω ∈ 1 − ξc
X(ω,t)=2 κN(t) for all ω,,
where κ>0,a n dID
c (ω,t) and ID
m(ω,t) are country D’s investment in R&D in the com-
petitive and in the non-competitive sectors respectively, and IF(ω,t) is research investment of
country F. The symmetric structure of the model leads us to study only symmetric allocation




m(t),I D(ω,t)=ID(t) for all ω ∈ (0,1).T h e










































,ω ∈ 1 − ξc,
where LD
c and LD
m are respectively the total domestic R&D labor used in the competitive
and non competitive sectors.
2.5 Labor markets clearing and national resource constraints
The unit cost of production for every good implies that the total production of goods in a
country is equal to the total labor used for manufacturing in that country. The total manufac-
turing labor is given by the total labor supply minus the labor used in R&D. The presence of
12a complete set of multinationals implies that both the labor and goods market clear globally.






























The LHS represents the total demand for goods (labor), and the RHS is total supply, given
by total labor resources minus labor used in research.10 To close the model I need to consider
the resource constraint of the two countries. In each country total expenditures plus savings
























































Notice that R&D investment is simply the wage bill of R&D workers and that each country
appropriates the monopoly rent in the subset of industries where that country is a world leader.
It is also worth noticing that we are assuming complete “home-bias” in asset ownership, in the
sense that domestic ﬁrms are completely owned by domestic population and foreign ﬁrms are
completely owned by foreign population. This assumption is supported by empirical evidence
on home-bias in asset ownership. French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995)
estimated the percentage of aggregate stock market wealth invested in domestic equities at the
beginning of the 1990s to be well above 90% in the U.S. and Japan and around 80% in the UK















1−α for the foreign country respectively.
11Segerstrom and Lundborg (2002) do not treat R&D expenditures as investment. They acknowledge that
R&D should be treated as investment in national accounts but in reality, they claim, this is not done. We
instead include R&D investment in the national budget constraint: one implication of this is that taxes levied
to fund R&D subsidy cancel out in the constraint with the reduction in R&D costs due to subsidies. Considering
R&D as current expenditures doesl not change our qualitative results.
13and Germany. I have also worked out an alternative set up with partial “home bias” in which
the qualitative results remain unaﬀected.12
Finally, I need to mention that hidden in the national resource constraints above is the
assumption of balanced trade. This assumption is acceptable when focusing only on steady
states equilibria, as I do in the next sections.
2.6 Balanced growth path
I focus on the steady state properties of the model, where per-capita endogenous variables



















































X(t)/X(t)=n. Finally, from the Euler equation for consumption
I get the steady state value of the interest rate, r(t)=ρ.
Taking into account the expressions for the labor used in R&D derived above, the set of




































,ω ∈ 1 − ξF (15)

























































12In appendix B we show how to modify the basic set up to account for partial home bias.
13Notice that x(t)=
X(ω,t)
N(t) , that from PEG it is constant at 2k.
14The equilibrium includes also the goods market clearing condition, but as this condition
turns out to be the sum of the two resource constraints (16) 17), the three equations are not
linearly independent and I can omit one of them. We are left with a system of ﬁve equations






Before solving the equilibrium systems and deriving the main implications I complete the
description of the model showing the welfare equations. Substituting the steady state instan-
taneous utility of the household problem (1) into the discounted utility I obtain discounted
welfare indicators for both countries,
W





























lnλ is the growth rate that, in our free trade economy,
beneﬁts consumers worldwide. Two-country endogenous growth models become complicated
when either structural or public policy diﬀerences produce diﬀerences in endogenous variables.14
Structural diﬀerences, in the form of diﬀerent research supports and policy diﬀerences, in the
form of national R&D subsidies, are crucial in my exploration of the eﬀect of international
competition on national welfare and optimal policy. In the following sections I show that an
analytical solution is attainable only for the simpliﬁed set up with CRS to R&D and symmetric
subsidies. For all other speciﬁcations I explore the implications of the model numerically.
3C o m p e t i t i o n , g r o w t h a n d w e l f a r e
In this section I abstract from government policy and explore the “pure” impact of increases
in the set of competitive sectors ω on innovation, growth, and domestic welfare. I discuss
and evaluate the role and the strength of the two forces at work: the international business-
stealing and the innovation eﬀect. Since the degree of convexity of R&D technology has both
computational and conceptual implications I proceed into steps. First, I set up a simple version
of the model with a constant returns technology for the research activity and I derive analytically
the growth and welfare eﬀects of competition. Later, we return to the general version of
14See Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002).
15the model reintroducing decreasing returns to scale (DRS) to R&D and present a numerical
comparative statics analysis.
3.1 Constant returns to scale in R&D
Assuming no government policy boils down to set R&D subsidies equal to zero in both coun-







.( 2 0 )
The removal of diﬀerent R&D subsidies and the introduction of a constant returns to scale
technology imply that R&D costs and beneﬁts are the same in both countries. It follows that
innovation in competitive sectors is the same in both countries, that is ID
c = IF.M o r e o v e r ,t h e
simpler R&D technology implies that the allocation of research eﬀorts between competitive and
non-competitive sectors is pinned down only by the rates of creative destruction. As we see in
eqs. (14) and (15), the optimal research allocation leads to the same economic obsolescence in







The assumption of CRS in R&D reduces substantially the nonlinearity of the steady state
systems of equations and we can easily work out a closed form solution of the model, obtain-
ing some insights on the pure eﬀects of competition on domestic income and on the rate of
innovation.
Proposition 1 For (λ − 1)A/κ ≥ (ρ − n) a steady state equilibrium exists at all levels of
competition ω. Increases in the set of competitive sectors have no eﬀects on the growth rate
and trigger a business-stealing eﬀect that reduces domestic proﬁts and welfare.
Proof. See appendix A.
The intuition for the lack of growth eﬀects of competition is based on the speciﬁcation of the
R & Dt e c h n o l o g y ,a n do nt h ef a c tt h a tt h et w oc o u n t r i e sa r ep e r f e c t l ys y m m e t r i ci na l lf e a t u r e s
except the number of sectors in which they innovate. In this economy there are two margins
15The same qualitative results can be obtained with a symmetric R&D policy, both countries setting the same
non-zero subsidy rate. We set it to zero for simplicity.
16that pin down the decision to invest in innovation: the allocation of labor resources between
production of goods and production of ideas, and the allocation of the research eﬀort between
competitive and non competitive sectors. The ﬁrst margin is not aﬀected by competition
because, as we can see in eq. (9) the cost of research is ﬁxed by the wage rate at 1.T h e
allocation of research eﬀort between the ω- t y p ea n dt h e( 1 − ω)-type of sectors, on the other
hand, is not aﬀected by competition because of constant returns in the research technology. In
fact, this speciﬁcation of technology implies that research is equally productive in competitive
and non competitive sectors and so a change in the scale of research activity, brought by
competition, does not aﬀect research productivity. Obsolescence of innovation will adjust to
accommodate foreign researchers in a way that (21) always hold. It follows that, as innovation
is the same in the two types of sectors, increases in competition will only increase the share of
innovation produced by ω-type sectors with no eﬀect on the total growth rate.
The business-stealing eﬀect reduces domestic aggregate proﬁts because foreign ﬁrms ap-
propriate a bigger share of the world market. Since, by assumption, the labor market is not
aﬀected by shifts in the global ownership distribution of ﬁrms, the domestic income will de-
crease with proﬁts. Considering the expression for the domestic resource constraint (16) it is
easy to see that this will reduce the resources available for consumption, thereby negatively
aﬀecting welfare in eq. (18).
Finally, even though competition has no eﬀects on the global innovation intensity, by increas-
ing the number of sectors where both countries innovate it raises the obsolescence on innovation
i nt h o s es e c t o r s ,t h u sr e d u c i n gt h es h a r eo fg l o b a li n n o v a t i o np e r f o r m e di nt h ed o m e s t i cc o u n t r y .







As a consequence the home country allocates more labor resources to the production of con-
sumption goods, so increasing consumption and welfare. As showed in eq. (29) in appendix A,
this eﬀect is weaker than the negative eﬀect of business-stealing on consumption, so the overall
eﬀect of competition on welfare is negative.
3.2 Decreasing returns to scale in R&D
Our next task is to switch back to the full model, reintroducing DRS in research and diﬀerent
R&D subsidies, and solve numerically for its steady state using Netwon’s method. I ﬁrst
calibrate the parameters of the model to match some basic long-run empirical regularities of the
17US economy. Then, I use the calibrated model to study the eﬀects of competition on domestic
welfare and on the optimal domestic R&D subsidy, assuming that the foreign government is
not active in subsidizing innovation.
3.2.1 Calibration
We have to calibrate 6 parameters, three of them, ρ,λ,n, will be calibrated using benchmarks
that are standard in the growth literature, and the others, A,α,k, will be calibrated internally
in order for the model’s steady state to match salient facts of the U.S. economy.
Parameters calibrated “externally”- Some parameters of the model have close coun-
terpart in real economies so that their calibration is straightforward. I initially set ρ,w h i c hi n
steady state is equal to the interest rate r,t o0.05. Jones and Williams (2000) suggest that the
interest rate in R&D-driven growth models is also the equilibrium rate of return to R&D, and
so it cannot be simply calibrated to the risk-free rate on treasury bills - which is around 1%.
They in fact calibrate their R&D-driven growth model with interest rates ranging from 0.04
to 0.14, which is closer to the average real return on the stock market for the past century of
0.07 estimated in Mehra and Prescott (1985) then to the return on risk-free assets. I set λ to
1.1 to match an average markup over the marginal cost of 0.1. Estimates of average mark-up
over the marginal cost range in the interval (0.1,0.4) (Basu 1996), which in my model implies
values for λ in the interval (1.1,1.4).Ic a l i b r a t en to match the population growth rate of 1%,
as is standard in the growth literature.
Parameters calibrated “internally”- I simultaneously choose (A,α,κ) so that the nu-
merical steady state solution of the model matches the following stylized facts. 1) An average
growth rate for the US economy of 2.3% in the period 1951-2000 (Penn World Table). 2)
An average R&D investment, as a share of GDP, of 2.5% in the period 1951-2000 (NSF S&E
Indicators 2004). 3) A consumption per capita of 0.67, in the period 1951-2004 (BEA NIPA
tables). 4) An average labor share of 0.67 for the period 1965-95 (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000).
5) I also use an initial value for the subsidy of 0.08, which is the weighted average of eﬀective
R&D tax credit16 for the period 1981-90, estimated in Hall (1992). Table I below summarizes
the benchmark parameters calibration.17
16The purpose of using an initial subsidy in our loss function is to set the calibrated parameters in way that,
when we study the numerical eﬀects of competition on the optimal subsidies we obtain realistic measures of the
subsidies.
17The parameters calibrated internally have been minimizing the quadratic distance between the model steady
18TABLE I
Benchmark parameters
parameter value moment to match source
ρ 0.07 interest rate Jones and Williams (2000)
λ 1.1 markup Basu (1996)
n 0.01 population growth rate Standard
A 0.55 internal various
α 0.77 internal various
κ 0.75 internal various
It is worth noting that by calibrating the model on U.S. data I am implicitly assuming
that the stylized facts listed above are similar in the two economies. Since we are studying
competition for innovation among technologically advanced countries this does not appear to
be an extremely restrictive assumption. If we consider OECD countries we ﬁnd many similarities
in the long-run fact described above.
3.2.2 Numerical simulations
Here I explore the impact of the business-stealing and of the innovation eﬀect of competition
on domestic growth and welfare. In Table III I report the results of the benchmark simulation,
and below I summarize the main ﬁndings.
Result 1. An increase in foreign competition has the following eﬀects on the domestic
country:
i. It triggers a business-stealing eﬀect that, by shifting monopoly rents from domestic to
foreign ﬁrms, reduces domestic aggregate proﬁts and income, thereby worsening welfare.
ii. It produces an innovation eﬀect that increases growth and welfare in both countries.
iii. It reduces the total amount of research labor.
iv. The overall eﬀect of competition on welfare is positive in the benchmark numerical simu-
lation, is decreasing in α, and becomes negative for α close to zero.
The business-stealing eﬀect works as in the simpler set up so aﬀecting negatively home
i n c o m ea n dw e l f a r e .I no rder to understand the eﬀects of competition on innovation we need
to sketch a heuristic proof of the result. We begin showing that for α>0 R&D investment
state and the stylized facts listed above.
19in equilibrium will be such that ID
m <I D
c + IF. In section 3 we saw that in the simpliﬁed
setting with CRS to R&D (α =0 ) the research arbitrage and free entry conditions (14),
(15), yield ID
m = ID
c + IF. Keeping this result in mind we consider the eﬀects of introducing
the R&D externality on the innovation arbitrage conditions. As in the simple model of the
previous section, the only relevant innovation choice aﬀected by competition is the one between
competitive and non-competitive sectors. Assume α>0 and consider the marginal beneﬁts of
investing in research in a
_




























1 − α (22)
The arrival rate of innovation in a non-competitive sector cannot be higher than the one in a
competitive sector. In equilibrium the no-arbitrage condition between investing in a R&D ﬁrm
in a competitive industry and in a non-competitive industry impose that the marginal beneﬁto f
R&D (marginal productivity of R&D times the present value of the monopolistic ﬁrm) is equal
in the two industries. Since the productivity of R&D is higher in the competitive industries (due
to the country-speciﬁc DRS in R&D) the value of the ﬁrm in equilibrium must be lower in these
industries. As the value of the ﬁrm is given by proﬁts (which are the same in both industries)
discounted by the interest rate and the creative destruction, it follows that innovation (creative
destruction) in the competitive sectors must be higher than in non-competitive sectors. Hence,
from (22) it follows that in equilibrium we will always have ID
m <I D
c + IF. Since, changes in









ω =0 . Thus, increases in competition raise the share of
industries with an higher innovation arrival rate, so producing a positive eﬀect on the aggregate









logλ>0 for all α>0.
20TABLE II
Numerical steady state with no policy
Competition 00 .20 .40 .60 .81
Income D 1.1836 1.1651 1.1467 1.1282 1.1098 1.0915
income F 1.0000 1.0183 1.0367 1.0550 1.0732 1.0915
ID
m 0.3305 0.3305 0.3305 0.3305 0.3305 0.3305
IA
c 0.2848 0.2848 0.2848 0.2848 0.2848 0.2848
IF 0.2848 0.2848 0.2848 0.2848 0.2848 0.2848
R&D Spending D 0.1638 0.1481 0.1324 0.1167 0.1011 0.0854
R&D Spending F 00 .0171 0.0343 0.0514 0.0684 0.0854
Growth rate 0.0315 0.036 0.0406 0.0451 0.0497 0.0542
Welfare D 0.7118 0.8229 0.9339 1.0449 1.1558 1.2667
Welfare F 0.6922 0.8071 0.9221 1.0370 1.1519 1.2667
Table III below shows the sensitivity of the growth and welfare eﬀects of competition to
changes in parameter α that measure the strength of the R&D country-speciﬁce x t e r n a l i t y .A s
stated in result 1 for small values of α the innovation and growth eﬀect of competition are
negligible and the business-stealing eﬀects dominates, so making competition bad for welfare.
For values of α larger than 2 competition is growth and welfare enhancing.
TABLE III
DRS to R&D, competition and growth
α =0 .5
Competition 00 .20 .40 .60 .81
Growth rate 0.0166 0.0181 0.0196 0.0211 0.0152 0.0241
Welfare D 0.3536 0.3871 0.4206 0.4539 0.2857 0.5206
α =0 .3
Competition 00 .20 .40 .60 .81
Growth rate 0.0097 0.0102 0.0108 0.0113 0.0119 0.0124
Welfare D 0.1975 0.2054 0.2132 0.2209 0.2286 0.2363
α =0 .1
Competition 00 .20 .40 .60 .81
Growth rate 0.0048 0.0049 0.0050 0.0052 0.0053 0.0054
Welfare D 0.1055 0.1000 0.0945 0.0889 0.0832 0.0775
As before, increases in foreign competition reduce the total amount of resources devoted to
research in the domestic country. This is a direct consequence of the fact that foreign researchers
21make innovation in the newly competitive sectors more obsolete. Using our expression for













is negative because from (22) we know that ID
m >I D
c .A s w e
saw in the simple model of the previous section, this implies that competition increases the
domestic resources allocated to production, thus raising the quantity of goods consumed by
domestic households. Again this is a second order eﬀect in the sense that it is not strong
enough to counteract the negative business-stealing eﬀect on welfare, as was the case in the
simpliﬁed model where competition has no innovation eﬀect. In fact table III shows that
domestic income declines substantially with increases in competition.
I nc o n c l u s i o n ,w eh a v ef o u n dt h a tt h ew e l f a r ee ﬀect of competition is ambiguous and depends
primarily on the strength of the R&D externality. It is also worth noticing that the assumption
of global labor markets prevents any eﬀect of competition on the labor market. Intuitively,
international competition, by shifting monopoly rents of some sectors from domestic to foreign
ﬁrms, aﬀects domestic workers only in that they will now work for foreign companies. There
are no job-displacements or wage adjustments; domestic plants are simply taken over by foreign
owners. This feature of the model reduces the impact of the business-stealing eﬀect on welfare,
thus overstating the positive welfare eﬀect of competition. Allowing for labor market that, at
least in part, clears locally the business-stealing eﬀect would reduce both proﬁts and wages, so
strenghtening the negative impact of competition on national welfare.18
4 International competition and optimal R&D subsidies:
one government active
Now that we know the how foreign competition aﬀects the domestic economy, we can reintroduce
policy and study the impact of competition on the optimal innovation subsidy. I use the
calibrated model to study the eﬀects of competition on the optimal home subsidy under the
assumption that the foreign country does not have an active R&D policy. More precisely, I
perform the following numerical experiment: I ﬁnd the steady state for all possible values of ω
and sD, and for a given value of sF, map the equilibrium domestic welfare levels for all possible
18The presence of a global patent and of multinational is a simplifying assumption that allows us to focus on
the rent-shifting eﬀect of competition. This is a conservative assumption that reduces the negative eﬀect of com-
petition on domestic welfare. Removing this hypothesis would reniforce the distorsionary eﬀect of competition
and strenghten its eﬀects on optimal subsidies.










Below I only present the numerical results of the benchmark model and in appendix C
I perform a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the results to changes in the free
parameters A, α, κ, ρ, n, λ. In Table III I report the results of the numerical simulation, and
result 2 summarizes the main ﬁndings.
Result 2. Increases in international competition reduce domestic income and raise the
growth rate, domestic welfare and optimal R&D subsidy.
TABLE IV
Competition & Optimal Subsidy
Competition 00 .20 .40 .60 .81
Optimal subsidy D .025 .095 .165 .230 .300 .370
Welfare Gains D % 0 .0008 .0025 .0048 .0080 .0121
To understand the movement of the optimal subsidy I show the welfare equation in a form
that facilitates the intuition of the mechanism behind the result, and decompose the eﬀects of
subsidies on the marginal condition of the domestic planner in setting optimal R&D subsidies.
Welfare in both countries can be expressed as
W
K = CS + Π
K + w − R
K (23)
where the consumer surplus equals the common growth rate, CS = CSD = CSF =
g/(ρ − n),a n dΠK = ΠD, ΠF are the logs of the per-capita aggregate real proﬁts for the
two countries19. The standard resource constraint eﬀect of innovation is represented by the log
of total real investment in research that reduces resources available for consumption, that is





























for the domestic and the foreign country respectively.






















Suppose ω =0 , then in evaluating the optimal R&D subsidy the domestic policy maker
will have to deal with the standard trade-oﬀ of one-country models. On the one hand, an
increase in domestic subsidies subtracts resources to manufacturing, thus reducing production
and the consumption component of welfare - this is the resource constraint eﬀect. On the
other hand, R&D subsidies stimulate domestic research that triggers innovation and raises
welfare via quality improvements - this is the innovation or consumer surplus eﬀect. The
optimal subsidy will be set at a level where the two counteracting forces do not allow for any
welfare-enhancing reallocation of resources between R&D and manufacturing. If we now let
international competition play a role, that is we assume ω>0, the policy maker needs to
take into account a third force: the international business-stealing eﬀect. From eq. (16) it
i se a s yt os e et h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nd o m e s t i cR & Di n v e s t m e n t( t r i g g e r e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nsD)
improves national ﬁrms’ capacity to appropriate global proﬁts rents, so raising national proﬁts
and, ceteris paribus, national consumption. It follows that competition makes R&D subsidies
more welfare enhancing at the margin and induces policy makers to raise their level. Using the
aggregate proﬁt equation, we can easily see that competition increases the magnitude of the
business-stealing eﬀect of subsidies, that is ∂2ΠD/(∂ω∂sD) > 0.
Finally, even though the optimal subsidy increases primarily for the strategic reasons that I
just discussed, foreign competition, by increasing the productivity of domestic R&D, improves
also the balance between the resource constraint and the consumer-surplus eﬀect. In fact, the
presence of local DRS in R&D implies that reasearch eﬃciency is higher in competitive sectors.
Hence, an increase in the number of competitive sectors raises the aggregate productivity of
domestic research labor so improving the marginal eﬀect of subsidies on innovation. Since
subsidies trigger more innovation and the latter is produced more eﬃciently, it follows that
competition increases subsidies also through its impact on the consumer surplus and resource
20The resource constraint eﬀect can be also interpreted in the more standard way of innovation subtracting
labor resources to the production of goods, so reducing production and consumption.
24constraint eﬀects.
In Table IV I also compute the welfare gains for the domestic country of following an optimal
subsidy rule, as competition changes, with respect to a ﬁxed subsidy rule. The simulation shows
that gains from the optimal policy rule, in terms of quality-adjusted per-capita consumption,
are increasing with competition from 0.04% with ω =0 .2 it rises to 1% with ω =1 .
5 International competition and the Research and Ex-
perimentation Tax Credit in the U.S.
In this section I use the model to perform a quantitative exercise. I ﬁrst build an empirical
indicator that matches my deﬁnition of international technological competition. Second, using
evidence from the R&D subsidy implicit in the R&E Tax Credit introduced in the U.S. in 1981,
I evaluate the optimality of this policy response to the observed increases in competition in the
period 1973-89. I include the entire period along which we observe increases in competition,
even though R&D subsidies are introduced only in 1981; since I perform an exercise in normative
economic analysis, the extended period allows me to study the eﬀects of the lack of government
response to competition in the period 1973-80.
5.1 Features of the data
My interest is in international competition among technological leaders. Hence, I restrict
the attention to the U.S., Japan, and 9 European countries: Germany, France, U.K., Italy,
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Spain, and the Netherlands. In the period 1973-1989,
R&D expenditures in these countries represented between 95 and 98 percent of the global R&D
investment in manufacturing.21 In this section I construct two indices of international R&D
rivalry. I ﬁrst build an indicator that embeds directly our deﬁnition of competition as the
measure of the set of industries where domestic and foreign countries compete for innovation.
Later, I construct a standard Herﬁndahl index of international R&D concentration, and show
that the two indicators deliver a similar picture of the facts. In both cases I use OECD ANBERD
data on R&D investment for two and three-digit manufacturing industries.
My original index is a measure of the overlapping research support that appears in the
model. I take the U.S. as my domestic, leading country, and Japan and the Europe, as the
21See OECD ANBERD Rev.2, 2005.
25foreign, follower countries. The basic criterion is the following: for each year, in the period 1973-
90, we consider a sector competitive if the U.S. share of total R&D investment in that sector
is smaller than 50%. My set of sectors is composed of 21 two and three-digits manufacturing
sectors, and the competitive subset, ω, is the number of sectors with U.S. share of R&D below
50% divided by the total number of sectors.22
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 shows that my measure of international competition in manufacturing has a clear
increasing trend in the period considered. Competitive sectors are 35 percent of the total in
1973, rising to 70 percent in 1990. When we focus only on high-tech and medium high-tech
sectors, the share of competitive sectors reaches its highest value of 70 percent in 1980. This
suggests that in technology-intensive sectors, the foreign challenge to U.S. leadership has grown
faster than in the rest of the economy. I also computed the index weighting the sectors with
their size (value added) and the trend in competition does not change very much.23
I ti si m p o r t a n tt oe m p h a s i z et h a tt h i sm e a s u r eo fc o m p e t i t i o nc a nb eb i a s e db yt h es i z eo f
the country: a small country like Luxemburg, for instance, it is bound to have ﬁrms investing
in R&D in fewer sectors. For this reason the index is only suitable in comparing economies
of similar size and at similar state of industrial development. In fact, this paper present a
North-North model where the only diﬀerence between the two countries is that, for exogenous
reasons, in one of them ﬁrms innovate in all sectors an in the other they innovate in only in a
subset.
Next, I check the robustness of my ﬁndings by building a more standard index of inter-
national R&D competition for the same countries and sectors. I use the Herﬁndahl index to
compute the geographical concentration of R&D investment by sector, and for each year I con-
sider the average across sectors. This index is simply the sum of the squares of each country’s















22ANBERD data do not consider only four 2-digits munufacturing sectors for measurement problems.
23The data and the results with diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the index are available upon request.
26Figure 2 suggests that the Herﬁndahl index shows a clear trend toward a less skewed inter-
national distribution of innovation activity in the period considered. Its value decreases from
0.37 in 1973 to 0.33 in 1990. Hence, both indicators suggest that there has been an increase in
international R&D competition in the 1970s and 1980s.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The erosion of U.S. leadership led policy makers to introduce new measures to reduce the
private cost of innovation. Fiscal incentives to R&D, like the Research and Experimentation
Tax Credit of 1981, were introduced. The stenghtening of intellectual protection, which began
with 1982 legislation which established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, improved
the protection granted to patents holders. The Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Amendments
Act of 1980 and the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, were both aimed to transform
federal laboratories into sources of innovation for U.S. ﬁrms. The former allowed agencies to
issue patents to small business and universities for inventions made with agency funds. The
latter promoted incentives for collaboration in research between federal laboratories and ﬁrms.
Another important initiative was the National Cooperative Research Act in 1984, which reduced
antitrust persecutions of joint ventures for pre-commercial research. Mowery (1998) describes
this set of policies as a "structural change in the US national innovation system": the post-1980
shift in technology policy direction, started during the Reagan and Bush administrations and
continued as a trademark of Clinton’s economic policy, was directly aimed at stimulating civilian
innovation, by strenghtening the appropriability of innovations and by facilitating private ﬁrms’
access to the gigantic pool of public technologies produced during the Cold War years.24 A
common characteristic of these policies is that they all aim at stimulating innovation by reducing
the cost of R&D.
I no u re x e r c i s ew ec o n s i d e ro n l yo n em e a s u r eo f this broad package of policies, the Research
and Experimentation Tax Credit introduced in 1981 as a temporary measure and renewed
yearly until recently when it was made permanent. The R&E tax credit is neither the most
relevant nor the most eﬀective R&D cost-reducing policy introduced in the 1980s, but it is the
only one for which there are aggregate data that can be easily used in a stylized macro model.25
24See Mowery (1998), Ham and Mowery (1997), Nelson and Romer (1997), and Cozzi and Impullitti (2004)
for a more detailed discussion of the technology policy shift in the 1980s.
25The intellectual property rigths the technology transfer policies mentioned above are relevant in terms of
27The R&E tax credit was initially a 25 per cent tax credit for “incremental” research and
development: incremental meant above the level of the previous year in 1981, and in the
following years the increase was measured over the average R&D in the previous three years.
The credit rate was reduced to 20 per cent from 1982 on. An important feature is that the tax
credit is targeted to purely technological R&D -several types of research in social sciences and
humanities were excluded. This technological focus meant that about 65 per cent of overall
R&D spending, as reported to the Internal Revenue Service, is eligible for tax credit on average
(Hall 1995).
Figure 1 shows Hall (1992) estimates of the average across ﬁrms of the eﬀective R&D
subsidy rate related to the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit.26 A ss h o w ni nt h e
ﬁgure, the eﬀective tax credit estimated by Hall, computing the reduction in the tax price of
R & Dp r o d u c e db yt h et a xc r e d i t ,ﬂuctuates around 3 and 5 percent of the cost of R&D in the
period considered. Although the legislation set the oﬃcial credit rate around 20 per cent, the
eﬀective credit rate has been on average around 4 per cent. This gap is due to the incremental
design of the credit: by increasing the current R&D investment a ﬁrm will increase its current
t o t a lt a xc r e d i tb u ti tw i l la l s or a i s et h eb a s el e v e lo fR & Da b o v ew h i c ht h ec r e d i ti sg r a n t e d
for the following three years.27
Even though the incremental feature of the tax credit reduced its eﬀective rate there is
extensive evidence showing that it did have an impact on private innovation. Hall (1992)
working on ﬁrm-level data ﬁnds that private innovation responds to reductions in the after-tax
cost of R&D -often called the tax price of R&D. In her estimates the tax price elasticity of
R&D is larger than one, which means that a 5 per cent eﬀective R&D tax credit leads to a
magnitude and impact on private innovation. For example, Link (1999) shows that in terms of government
expenditures ﬁve technology transfer program, the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR), the
CRADAS, the Advanced Technology Program (ATP), SEMATECH, and the Dual-Use Technology Program,
amounted to about 3.5 billions on average in the period 1993-96. To put this public direct funding to private
research in a policy perspective, in the same period it has been estimated that the total government spending
implicit in the R&E tax credit is around 1.6 billions. Hence, these ﬁve programs sum up to government outlays
that are double the costs of the R&E tax credit. Notice that, other important public/private cooperation
programs, like the research joint ventures under the NCRA, are not included here because of lack of data on
their cost.
26The average is weighted with R&D spending by each ﬁrm. See Hall (1992) for details on the estimation
method.
27We can illustrate the point with a simple example. If the oﬃcial credit rate is 25 per cent, the cost to the
ﬁrm of $1 of incremental R&D would be reduced by $0.25.H o w e v e r ,t h e$1 increase in R&D decreases the tax
credit for the next three years by $0.33x0.25 = $0.083 for each year. With a discount rate if 10 per cent the
eﬀctive tax reduction of a $1 increase of R&D spending is $0.25 −
³P3
i=1 $0.083/(1 = 0.1)
i
´
=$ 0 .045.T h u s ,
the oﬃcial tax credit rate of 25 per cent becomes an eﬀective rate of 4.5 per cent.
285 percent increase in R&D at the ﬁrm level on average. This ﬁndings are conﬁrmed by those
in Hines (1993) that uses diﬀerent econometric methods, and by those in Baily and Lawrence
(1992) based on macro data. Bloom, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (2000) ﬁnd an elasticity around
unity for a panel of countries including the U.S. in the period 1981-99.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the R&E tax credit is only a part of the R&D tax policy
in the US, the other important parts are the general expensing rules for R&D and the foreign
source income allocation rules for R&D. In brief, the ﬁrst of these components is very relevant:
from 1956 R&D expenditures can be expensed for tax purposes and this implies a 100 per cent
write-oﬀ of expenses on a type of investment that do not generate income immediately. This
is already a tax subsidy on R&D expenditures whose rate is equal to the corporate tax rate.
The other component it is relative to tax treatment of expenses of multinational corporation.28
This paper focuses only on the R&E tax credit because it represents the major change in R&D
tax policy in the 1980s.29
A ﬁnal remark of the way I model the R&E tax credit is needed. If the corporate tax rate
does not change the expensing of R&D cost for tax purposes does not inﬂuence the decision to
invest in research and development: the corporate tax rate is applied to total revenues net of all
costs, including R&D costs. Thus, our stylized economy with no corporate tax rate is similar to
one where the corporate tax rate is constant over time. As a consequence, the R&E tax credit
can be modeled as a subsidy to research and development additional to the tax subsidy implicit
i nt h ee x p e n s i n go fR & D ;a n d ,s i n c ew ed on o ts t u d yt h ee ﬀects of changes in the corporate
tax credit, it is possible to model the research tax credit as a simple R&D subsidy.30
5.2 Welfare analysis
The scope of our quantitative experiment is to evaluate the optimality of the R&E Tax Credit
in the U.S. as a response to the increase in technological competition in the 1970s and 1980s.
28A discussion of these the components of the US tax policy other than the R&E tax credit is beyond the
scope of this paper. Exaustive discussions of these issues can be found in Hall (1992) and Hines (1993).
29Another important aspect of tax policy that might have played a role for innovation activity in the 1980s
is the taxation on capital equipment. Much of the industrial R&D in the last 20 years has been performed in
the capital equipment industries, and this means that tax subsidies to capital equipment have an impact on the
demand of R&D. This aspect has been neglected in studies on the eﬀects of the R&D tax policy but it might
be important, as suggested by Hall (1995) and Mammuneas and Nadiri (1996).
30This actually seems to be a good way to model an R&D tax credit in a framework where only followers do
research. It is as if we would have introduced a corporate tax rate on R&D ﬁrms, allow total expensing of R&D
- so the corporate rate disappears from the FOC- and intruduce an additional tax credit that reduces the cost
of R&D at the eﬀective R&E credit rate.
29I compute the U.S. welfare with the observed levels of competition, using the index for the
measure of the overlapping research support ω, and the subsidy rate, shown in ﬁgure 1; then I
c o m p a r et h i st ot h ew e l f a r eu n d e rt h es a m ec o m petition levels but using the optimal subsidy



































+l n ( 1+β)
and we chose β such that c WD = W∗D,w h e r eW∗D is the present value of optimal welfare.
Thus, β is the share of quality-adjusted per-capita consumption lost in the observed policy with
respect to the optimal policy. Table V shows that the welfare loss of the observed policy is
in the range of 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points of quality-adjusted per-capita consumption. The
average loss over the period considered is about 0.4 per cent which implies a total loss of 8 per
cent of per-capita quality adjusted consumption. Furthermore, the results suggests that the
cost of a non-optimal policy increases in the scale of international competition.
TABLE V
Welfare loss related to observed US R&D Subsidy
years 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
competition 0.35 0.40 .45 0.50 .55 0.65 0.65 0.70 .7
optimal subsidy .1450 .1630 .1800 .1970 .2150 .2490 .2490 .2670 .2670
observed subsidy 00 0 0 .034 .05 .053 .036 .033
welfare Loss in % .0020 .0024 .0030 .0035 .0031 .0038 .0037 .0050 .0051
The U.S. R&E Tax Credit estimated in Hall (1992) does not seem to be responding optimally
to changes in competition. Even though the scope of this exercise is not to explain the actual
U.S. policy response to competition I will make a few remarks on how future research could
tackle a positive analysis of the facts.
F i r s t ,t h en o n - o p t i m a l i t yo ft h eU Sr e s p o n s em i g h tb ed u et ot h ef a c tt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n t
did not target social welfare in choosing the R&E tax credit. It might be that in setting its
innovation policy the U.S. government has privileged speciﬁc rather than general interests.
In this case, then, a political economy approach could help explaining the conduct of policy
makers.
30Second, as I mentioned above, we do not have an appropriate measure of the supply-side
policy response to competition implemented in the U.S. in that period. Here there are several
issues to discuss. In the ﬁrst place, the eﬀective size of the R&E tax credit has been greatly
reduced by its incremental feature, and so has been the scale of its impact. In the second place,
the government might have used tax instruments that have an indirect impact on R&D, such as
tax credit on investments in capital equipment, that our model cannot account for. This could
be an interesting theme for future research. In the third place, non-tax policies might have been
considered more eﬀective than direct R&D subsidies in response to international competition.
For lack of date it is very hard to measure for the impact on private innovation of the technology
transfer and intellectual property rights policies introduced in the 1980s. Further work is needed
for a better measurement of these policy tools. In conclusion, for a more complete evaluation of
the US innovation policy response to international competition we would primarily need better
data; once in possession of better measures of policy, the model should be extended introducing
a more complete set of supply-side innovation policy instruments, such as, patent policy and
some mechanism of technology transfer from public labs and agencies to private ﬁrms.
6 Strategic policy complementarity
Next, I remove the assumption that the foreign country is not active in subsidizing R&D and
explore the eﬀects of strategic policy complementarity. I ﬁrst search for the existence of a
strategic policy interaction between the two policy makers, and then test the robustness of
Result 1 studying the eﬀects of competition on the optimal domestic competitive subsidy.
Finally, I explore the role of competition in shaping the incentives for cooperation in R&D
policy.
6.1 International R&D rivalry and policy competition
A two-stage policy game between the two countries is set up: at stage 1, countries set their
subsidies, and at stage two R&D and manufacturing ﬁrms choose their proﬁt maximizing level
of activity, and households choose their utility maximizing consumption bundles. Policy makers
simultaneously repeat the game setting diﬀerent subsidies in order to solve ∂WK/∂sK =0 .
The ﬁrst step is to verify the presence of strategic interaction, that is, to study the eﬀect
of the R&D subsidy of a country on the optimal subsidy of the other. Second, I show that the
31R&D policy competition that results from strategic interactions allows for a Nash equilibrium
solution, and study the ways competition aﬀects it.
As before, we proceed with the numerical solution using the benchmark calibrated para-
meters. The algorithm to compute the best response functions is straightforward: I ﬁxt h e
competition level, and for each point in the grid of a country’s subsidy I compute the optimal
subsidy of the other country; the same exercise is then repeated at diﬀerent levels of compe-
tition. In ﬁgures 3 to 5 we plot the best response functions for the two countries at diﬀerent
levels of competition.
[FIGURES 3-5 ABOUT HERE]
Result 3. The strategic policy complementarity induced by the business-stealing eﬀect of
R&D subsidy competition leads to upward sloping best response functions.
In order to clarify the intuition behind this result we need to understand how changes in
the subsidy of a country aﬀect the marginal conditions used by policy makers in the other
country to set its optimal R&D subsidy. I focus on the impact on the optimal home subsidy
of increases in the foreign subsidy. I again refer to the eﬀects of home subsidies on home
welfare shown in (24). First, since I assumed DRS in R&D at the industry level, increases
in the intensity of foreign research do not aﬀect directly the productivity of domestic R&D,
so it does not aﬀect the marginal eﬀect of domestic subsidies on innovation. Second, raising
foreign research increases the obsolescence of innovation in competitive sectors, thus reducing
domestic research in those sectors. It follows that the marginal productivity of domestic R&D
increases, and thus at the margin, the innovation eﬀect of domestic subsidy is stronger while
the resource constraint is weaker. Finally, the business-stealing eﬀect of domestic subsidies
becomes stronger because now domestic ﬁrms are aggressively challenged by foreign innovators
in competitive sectors, thus the rent-shifting eﬀect of subsidies is more relevant than before.
Intuitively, higher foreign subsidies imply higher intensity of foreign business-stealing, therefore
the role of domestic subsidies as a rent-shifting devise increases. From (16) it is easy to see that
the eﬀect of home subsidies on home proﬁts is increasing in the level of the foreign subsidy, that
is to say that the cross-partial ∂2ΠD/(∂sF∂sD) is positive. In conclusion, an increase in the
foreign subsidy improves the marginal eﬀects of the domestic subsidy on welfare, thus producing
32a positive eﬀect on the optimal domestic subsidy. The explanation for the best-response of the
foreign country is analogous and we can omit it.
It is worth noticing that when research supports are asymmetric (ω<1) the Nash equi-
librium strategy shows high subsidy in the foreign and low subsidy in the domestic country.
This implies that the smaller is the set of sectors where national ﬁrms innovate the higher
the optimal subsidy is. Intuitively, in a model with country and sector speciﬁcD R Si nR & D ,
both the creative and the destructive eﬀects of innovation occur locally and at the industry
level. It follows that with few innovative sectors a lot of research eﬀort will be concentrated in
those sectors, innovation will have high obsolescence rate and research will be less productive.
As a consequence, the market solution will show more underinvestment in R&D than in those
economies with a bigger set of innovative sectors.31
Result 4. An increase in the level of international competition raises the optimal com-
petitive subsidy of the domestic country. This subsidy is higher than the one without strategic
policy complementarity at each level of competition.
This result shows that the positive eﬀect of competition on the optimal domestic subsidy
is robust to the introduction of strategic policy complementarities. In ﬁgures 3-4 we see that
increases in competition shift the domestic best response function upwards, and also make it
steeper. The driving force of these changes is again the business-stealing eﬀect. As R&D rivalry
increases, the threat of international rent-stealing becomes more relevant and triggers a higher
competitive (Nash) subsidy. More precisely, higher foreign competition implies a higher scale of
foreign business-stealing because the number of industries where domestic ﬁrms are challenged
by foreigners is larger. Moreover, the same factor makes the domestic best response steeper,
which implies that the sensitivity of domestic optimal subsidy to changes in sF raises. Here the
idea is that as competition increases the scale of business-stealing foreign subsidies represent a
wider threat for the domestic market leadership.
31It is possible to prove this result analytically. In Appendix D, available upon request, I develop a single-
country version of the model where ﬁrms innovate only in a subset of sectors. I show that, if parameters values
satisfy Alnλ>k (ρ − n), the optimal subsidy is always decreasing in the set of innovative sectors. It is easy to
check that our calibrated parameters satisfy this restriction (0.55ln1.1=0 .0524 > 0.75(0.05 − 0.01) = 0.03).
33TABLE VI
Competition & optimal Nash subsidy
Competition 0.20 .40 .60 .81
optimal subsidy .095 .165 .230 .300 .370
optimal Nash subsidy 0.10 .18 0.26 0.34 0.42
In this paper we are mainly interested in studying the domestic country, the former leader
that experiences increasing competition from the foreign follower. Thus, we comment only
brieﬂy on the latter. The smaller change in foreign Nash subsidies is the result of a general
equilibrium eﬀect. On the one hand, an increase in ω raises both foreign innovation and its
national aggregate proﬁts, so for each sD the level of sF that maximizes WF should be lower
— in fact, foreign best response shifts left. On the other hand, the fact that the domestic best
response shifts upward, as ω increases, triggers strategic interaction, and the foreign policy
maker reacts by raising its subsidy - a movement along foreign’s best response. The small eﬀect
of competition on foreign subsidies is the general equilibrium result of these two counteracting
forces: the movement along foreign’s best response, triggered by domestic aggressive policy,
more than compensates the shift of foreign’s best response.
Finally, as we can see in table IV, the presence of strategic policy competition produces an
increase of the optimal domestic Nash subsidy with respect to the case with no strategic policy
complementarities. As we discussed above, introducing foreign R&D subsidies implies a higher
intensity of the international business-stealing threat, thus leading the domestic policy maker
to set larger subsidies at each level of competition.
6.2 The gains from cooperation in innovation policy
International policy competition yields national subsidies that are not optimal from a global
point of view for the following reasons: ﬁrst, governments do not take into account the positive
innovation eﬀect of R&D subsidies on foreign consumer surplus; second, the negative business-
stealing eﬀect of national subsidies on foreign aggregate proﬁts is not considered by governments
that maximize their own welfare. Hence, the need for policy coordination emerges.
In this section I introduce policy coordination that internalizes the business-stealing eﬀect
and takes into account the consumer surplus (innovation) eﬀe c ti nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .W ec o n s i d e r
a form of cooperation where subsidies are set separately by governments in order to maximize
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is the global welfare equation. Using our benchmark calibrated parameters, we compute
numerically the optimal subsidies under cooperation, sD
c and sF
c , and compare the welfare
outcome of cooperative and non-cooperative policy (sD
n ,sF
n).
Result 5. International competition induces R&D policy cooperation. For the country that
experiences increases in foreign competition, the home country in our model, the incentives to
cooperate are negative at low levels of competition but raise with competition and, after the
threshold
_
ω =0 .5, become increasingly positive .
TABLE VII
Gains from cooperative R&D policy




















0.20 .59 0.76 0.10 .41 −0.0352 0.1486
0.40 .64 0.76 0.18 0.41 −0.0018 0.1191
0.50 .67 0.77 0.22 0.41 0.0125 0.1066
0.60 .69 0.77 0.26 0.41 0.0265 0.0944
0.80 .73 0.77 0.34 0.41 0.0489 0.0755
10 .78 0.78 0.42 0.42 0.0627 0.0627
A ﬁrst result shown in Table VII is that, as it was the case with no cooperation, foreign
competition increases domestic optimal subsidies. Moreover, it turns out that the level of opti-
mal domestic subsidy is higher with cooperation than without it. To grasp the intuition of the
mechanisms at work here we need to examine the eﬀects of domestic subsidies on the global




























35Comparing (26) with (24) we can observe that two additional eﬀects appears in the case
with cooperation. First, there is the internalization of the negative business-stealing eﬀect
of domestic subsidies on foreign proﬁts. Second, domestic subsidies have a double consumer
surplus eﬀect, because policy cooperation takes into account the positive quality-improving
eﬀect of R&D subsidies in both countries. Therefore in the cooperative solution we have two
additional and counteracting eﬀects of domestic subsidy: the negative business-stealing eﬀect
on foreign income that is internalized when domestic government maximizes aggregate welfare,
and which reduces the optimal subsidy, and the positive innovation eﬀect on foreign welfare
which increases the optimal domestic subsidy. In our numerical simulation this second eﬀect
is stronger than the ﬁrst eﬀect, which explains the result that optimal domestic subsidies are
higher in the cooperative equilibrium.
The intuition for the relationship between the optimal domestic subsidy and competition
is as follows: the business-stealing eﬀe c ti so u to ft h eg a m ew i t hc o o p e r a t i o n ,s ow ef o c u so n
the two remaining eﬀects shown in (26). We have a standard resource constraint eﬀect and a
double innovation eﬀect. The fact that the optimal domestic subsidy increases with competition
is related to the speciﬁcation of R&D technology: DRS to R&D imply that when competition
is low research is performed mainly by domestic workers, so their productivity is low. With
increases in competition, a larger share of research is conducted by foreigners. Thus, research
eﬀort is more evenly spread among countries and, as a consequence, domestic R&D labor is
more productive and the innovation eﬀect of subsidies is higher. It follows that the optimal
domestic subsidy will be higher the higher is the level of competition.
Finally, table VII presents the main result of this section: the home country gains from
cooperation only at high levels of competition, and incentives to cooperate increase with com-
petition. Symmetrically, foreign gains from cooperation decrease with the level of international
competition. Intuitively, the domestic government has little incentive to cooperate when com-
petition is low because foreign innovation and business-stealing are not suﬃciently relevant.
Hence, when the competitive threat is low the domestic country has few incentives to internal-
ize foreign business-stealing while the opposite happens in the foreign country.
I want to conclude this section suggesting a possible application of this last result. My
ﬁndings in this section may be of particular relevance for innovation policy in the European
Union. In fact, the E.U., to a larger extent than for instance NAFTA and ASEAN, has an
36institutional framework that could potentially promote R&D policy coordination. The E.U.
has common policy in many areas, such as trade, regulation, and competition, but seems to
leave innovation policy to national governments. As clearly stated in the Sapir Report: “Many
policies are decided and implemented autonomously ‘within’ Member States ....this can be re-
garded as a regime of policy competition. Examples include, education, innovation [...] There
is very little legislative EU activity in the ﬁelds of innovation, education and research, all of
which are meant to represent common priorities for the Lisbon Strategy” (Sapir 2003 p.76
and p.78).32 Moreover, in Europe we observe some national economies like Germany, Swe-
den, and France innovating in a broad variety of sectors, while in some others, especially the
newer members from eastern Europe, innovation is scanty and concentrated in fewer sectors.
For instance, excluding R&D investment form Italy, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Finland, and
the Netherlands, in the computation of the Herﬁndahl index for each single industry, does not
substantially change the index.33 In these cases, where research asymmetries among countries
are strong, our analysis could provide a basic framework for evaluating the welfare gains of
cooperative R&D policies. Our results suggest that leading-edge countries would experience
a welfare loss when forced to cooperate with backward countries, and would gain when they
coordinate their R&D policy with other leading countries. As a consequence, the E.U. Com-
mission’s laissez-faire attitude might be motivated by the reluctance of the leading countries
- those with higher investment in innovation and higher decision power - to coordinate their
policy with the laggards. The enlargement of the EU to include Eastern European countries
has increased geographic asymmetries in the area and, in doing so, it might have decreased
the leaders’ willingness to cooperate in innovation. A possible policy implication is that only
by reducing regional disparities, that is by increasing technological competitiveness of lagging
members in many sectors, will it be possible to design a credible common innovation policy in
Europe. Further research could explore the implications and the empirical relevance of this of
this interpretation.
32Recently some works in the strategic industrial policy literature have begun tackling the issue of R&D
policy coordination in economic unions. See, for example, Haaland and Kind (2004).
33See also the evidence in Archibugi and Coco (2005).
377C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I have analyzed the eﬀects of international competition on optimal innovation
subsidies. I have used a quality-ladders non-scale growth model where domestic and foreign
ﬁrms compete to invent the next top-quality good in order to appropriate the global monopoly
rents associated with it. The scale of international competition is modeled as the measure of
the set of industries where foreign and domestic R&D workers compete for innovation. Trade
is free but innovation policy is active by means of subsidies to R&D.
F i r s t ,Ih a v ei n v e s t i g a t e dt h ep u r ee ﬀects of competition on innovation, growth, and welfare.
For this purpose I set up a simpliﬁed version of the model where government policy has been
removed, or equivalently I set R&D subsidies at a common level in both countries, and found
that the innovation eﬀect of competition strongly depends on the speciﬁcation of the R&D
technology. I showed that with CRS in R&D competition has no innovation eﬀects and has a
negative business-stealing eﬀect that reduces domestic income and welfare. Introducing DRS to
R&D I ﬁnd that a high concavity of the research technology implies a strong innovation eﬀect
of competition. For suﬃciently high decreasing returns to research the innovation eﬀect more
than compensates the business-stealing eﬀect and competition proves to be welfare enhancing.
Second, I allowed the domestic government to subsidize R&D, while still keeping the foreign
government inactive, and studied the optimal response of the domestic subsidies to increases in
foreign competition. I found that in the benchmark numerical simulation the optimal domestic
subsidies are increasing in the scale of competition. This result is robust to the sensitivity
analysis performed on a wide range of parameters’ deviation from the benchmark. The result
is driven by the international business-stealing eﬀect produced by the arrival of foreign inno-
vators in sectors where domestic ﬁrms were previously unchallenged. Intuitively, the higher
the threat of international competition the more instrumental innovation subsidies will be in
helping domestic incumbent ﬁrms retain their shares of the global market.
Third, I have applied this last result to the evaluation of the optimality of the U.S. R&D
subsidies response to increasing international competition in the 1970s and 1980s. I built an
indicator of international R&D rivalry that matches our idea of competition and found that
the set of competitive sectors increased form 30 percent 1973 to 70 percent in 1989. Using this
indicator I found that the observed policy response to competition implies a welfare loss in the
range of 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points of quality-adjusted per-capita consumption, and the loss
38is increasing in the level of competition.
Finally I removed the assumption that only domestic subsidies respond to competition and
extended the model to account for international policy complementarities. I showed that my ba-
s i cr e s u l ti sc o n ﬁrmed in this more complex and realistic exercise: foreign competition increases
the optimal domestic Nash subsidy. Moreover, the presence of strategic policy complementari-
ties suggests the importance of evaluating the gains from cooperation in R&D policy. I found
that for the foreign (laggard) country, gains are always positive and increasing in competition.
The domestic (leading) country loses from cooperation at low level of competition, and the
losses are decreasing with competition; above the threshold of 50 percent of competitive in-
dustries the losses become gains. This result might provide a ﬁrst insight on the problem of
coordinating innovation policy in the E.U.: leading countries might have been beneﬁting from
the lack of a common innovation policy and this could explain the institutional inertia on the
issue.
There is not an extensive literature on the speciﬁc issues addressed in the paper. Com-
petition in growth models is generally introduced as a change in the degree of market power
or a change in the intensity of entry of new ﬁrms in the product market (see e.g. Aghion
and Griﬃth 2005, and Tang and Waelde 2001). Morover, little research has been dedicated
to the study of the welfare eﬀects on competition and of its optimal policy implications. The
contribution of this paper is to focus on a dimension of competition, diﬀerent from changes in
entry and market structure, and directly study its optimal policy implications. Trade or entry
liberalization in the product market might not necessarily imply that foreign innovators will
challenge previous world leaders. Liberalizing the world market for aircrafts may not create
another Airbus immediately: it might take another historical policy measure, as a group of
European countries did in the 1980s, to create a competitive aircraft industry from scratch.
For some social and/or institutional reasons, countries may concentrate their innovation eﬀorts
in some sectors and not in others, even if entry and trade are free in all industries34.
In the section on strategic complementarities the paper touched on some issues that are
proper of the strategic trade and industrial policy literatures. Here the basic contribution is
the introduction of strategic policy considerations in an endogenous growth model. This allows
34Cozzi (2005) shows that in a tariﬀ free world social norms might have a role in shaping the international
distribution of innovation eﬀorts. In an neo-Shumpeterian framework with sunsopt equilibria he shows that
industrial policies might have a role as coordination devises.
39to study the impact of competition on the optimal strategic subsidy in a set up that adds to the
standard business-stealing eﬀect the innovation and growth eﬀect of competition on welfare.
This paper is amenable to many extensions. First, removing the assumption of the presence
of a full set of multinationals in every industry could allow us to account for the eﬀects of
competition on the labor market. With a labor market clearing locally, at least in part, the
eﬀect of competition on optimal policy should be stronger: an international wage-stealing eﬀect
would be added to the business-stealing. Moreover, introducing frictions in the labor market
could allow us to study the unemployment eﬀects of competition: the international business-
stealing eﬀect will destroy jobs, the innovation eﬀect of competition will create jobs, and the
net eﬀect of the two forces will determine the ﬁnal impact on unemployment.
As a second extension, future research could improve our preliminary attempt at a quan-
titative evaluation of the optimality of the U.S. policy response to increasing international
competition in the last decades. Improving the measurement of the innovation cost-reducing
policies introduced in the 1980s is needed for a more detailed and complete quantitative exer-
cise. Extending to model to include a broader set of policy instruments is another step in the
direction of improving the breadth and quality of our quantitative exercise. Furthermore, these
extensions and better data can also allow the use of this model for a positive analysis of the
U.S. policy response to competition.
Thirdly, in this set up, the scale of international competition is exogenous. Introducing
a mechanism of imitation, or letting the set of competitive sectors depend on institutional
changes, can provide a link between the competition and economic decisions, thus endogenizing
the degree of technological competition.
Finally, in the baseline model, as it is standard in quality-ladder models, only followers do
R&D. Entry of foreign research ﬁrms increases the economic obsolescence of innovation and
produces a congestion eﬀect at the industry-level that reduces the productivity of researchers.
As a consequence domestic followers can only respond to competition by adjusting their re-
search eﬀort to the new obsolescence level of innovation, and competition ends up discouraging
domestic innovation. Introducing innovation by incumbent ﬁrms, as for instance in Aghion et
al. 2003 and 2004, Segerstrom (2005), Etro (2004) could account for positive eﬀects of foreign
competition on domestic incumbents’ innovation. Domestic incumbents incentives to innovate
in order to escape entry of foreign ﬁrms and keep their leadership may be stronger than the
40disincentive related to the standard "Arrow eﬀect". Hence, with innovation by incumbents,
changes in the scale of competition could produce a mechanism of “defensive innovation” dif-
ferent from that in Thoenig and Verdier (2003). Moreover, my framework could be used to
evaluate the optimality of the market response to competition and study the role for corrective
policies.
41Appendix A: steady state equilibrium with no policy and CRS in
R&D
Here I derive the equilibrium conditions for the simpliﬁed set up with no subsidies and CRS
to R&D (α =0 ) and provide a proof of proposition 1. A ﬁrst implication of these simplifying
assumptions is that foreign and domestic research in competitive sectors are equal, that is
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Substituting into the labor market clearing and the resource constraint conditions (11) (16) and
(17) and keeping one of the two free entry and arbitrage conditions, precisely (28), we obtain
a system of three equations and three unknowns (ID
m,c D,c F). It is easy to prove that that only
two of eqs. (11), (16) and (17) are linearly independent, so we can solve the system. After























For (λ − 1)A/k ≥ (ρ − n) we have an equilibrium with positive investment in innovation.
These equilibrium conditions show that increases in foreign competition do not aﬀect innovation,
reduce domestic and increase foreign consumption, thus proving proposition 1.
Appendix B: partial home bias in asset ownership
The alternative setup modiﬁes the national resource constraints in order to account for the
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where φ is the share of domestic assets owned by domestic consumers, γ is the share of
foreign asset owned by domestic consumers, and vA
m, vA
c , vF, are the values of domestic and
foreign ﬁrms. Thus, national income, the RHS of the resource constraint, is given by wages
plus returns on assets owned by domestic consumers. Symmetrically for the foreign country we
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Appendix C: sensitivity analysis
In this section I test the robustness of our basic results to changes in the calibrated parameters.
Ir e p o r to n l yt h ee ﬀects of parameters changes on the ﬁndings in result 2, that is on the impact
of competition on optimal R&D subsidy.35 More precisely, for each parameter A, α, k, ρ,
n, λ I take values representing about one half and twice the benchmark, and I simulate the
eﬀect of competition on the optimal R&D subsidy.36 I am mainly interested in showing the
robustness of our mechanism to changes in the parameters’ choice, so I will not provide a
detailed analysis of the eﬀect of each parameter on the optimal subsidy and on the relationship
between competition and R&D subsidies. For a rigorous account of these eﬀects, a full welfare
analysis should be performed, but the complexity of the model makes this exercise, as much
as the derivation of the steady state equilibrium, analytically intractable. Hence, I will only
brieﬂy discuss the cases where the results are weaker, providing some intuition of the forces at
work in those cases.
I report the results of the sensitivity analysis in ﬁgure A. The ﬁrst thing that we observe
looking at the ﬁgure is that we do not ﬁnd cases that contradiction the basic ﬁnding reported
35We also performed the robustness check for the model with strategic interaction, and we found that para-
meters change aﬀect the two frameworks similarly.
36At the lower bound of some parameters value there is no real numerical solution. In these cases we take the
lower value for which a solution exists. This happens with α, for which we take a lower bound at 0.5,a n dw i t h
A,f o rw h i c hw es e tal o w e rb o u n da t0.4.M o r e o v e rw es e tt h el o w e rb o u n df o rρ at the minimum compatible
with the standard condition of bounded intertemporal utility, that is ρ>n . Finally, the value of the quality
jump λ is already set at a low level in the bechmark, so we choose a quality jump of 1 percent to be the lower
bound.
43in result 2. In fact, even though we do have situations where competition has a negligible eﬀect
on the optimal subsidy, in no cases there is a negative eﬀect. Digging deeper into the various
cases I discuss here those two special situations: one where competition has no eﬀect on the
optimal subsidy: strong DRS to R&D, α =0 .99, and another when the optimal subsidy is
always positive, ρ =0 .1.
[FIGURE A ABOUT HERE]
As I have widely discussed above, higher values of α imply a high innovation eﬀect of
competition, so leading to large improvements in domestic welfare. Intuitively, a stronger
concavity of the R&D technology makes innovation by two countries much more productive
than innovation with only one country. Hence, the sensitivity analysis shows numerically the
eﬀects of changes in α discussed intuitively in result 1. A consequence of this large innovation
eﬀect of competition is that, as shown in ﬁgure A.2b., it nulliﬁes the impact of the business-
stealing eﬀect on the optimal subsidy. Notice that the optimal subsidy is stuck at an extremely
negative value, this is due to the fact that R&D activity is not productive enough to compensate
for the resources it uses from social point of view. Hence, it is optimal to tax R&D at each
level of competition.
When the population discounts the future heavily -high ρ that in steady state implies high
rate of interest r- it is intuitive to expect that the consumer surplus (or innovation) eﬀect of
R&D subsidy is low, as we see in eq. (18). It follows that, as showed in ﬁgure A 4b., the
resource constraint eﬀect dominates the business-stealing and consumer surplus eﬀects, and
the optimal subsidy is always negative. Even though the resource constraint eﬀect dominates,
the strength of the business-stealing eﬀect of subsidies is strongly increasing in competition
and, in line with result 2, we obtain that the R&D tax is decreasing with competition.37
Finally, when competition is low we ﬁnd a negative optimal subsidyr a t ea tl o wt o t a lf a c t o r
productivity of R&D, low A, low quality jumps λ, and high R&D diﬃculty index k. In all these
cases though, the the business-stealing eﬀect of subsidy is strong enough to increase optimal
subsidies, so conﬁrming the robustness of our ﬁndings in result 2.
37We do not report the sensitivity analysis for changes in n because it is symmetrical to changes in ρ.T h e y
act in an opposite direction on the discount factor.
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Figure A.  Sensitivity analysis 
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